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Thomas Richter
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract
That hydrocarbon abundance may lead to more violence is an established truism in the literature on the resource curse. Look-
ing at the Middle East, however, the literature relates bellicose state behaviour entirely to oil-producing revolutionary repub-
lics. Instead, dynastic monarchies are claimed to be the more peacefully behaving actors. Current developments turn this
conclusion upside down, however. Since 2015 at the latest, the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia, the leading monarchy in the
Middle East, has transformed from multi-dependence to petro-aggression. By discussing this striking transformation, the paper
puts forward a framework looking at the interaction of three crucial dimensions: first, the decreasing power projection towards
the Middle East by the United States, the decade-long hegemon, due to gradual changes in world energy markets and war
fatigue at home; second, the lasting fiscal potency of the Saudi regime; and, third, the personalization of the Saudi monarchy
under King Salman as a historically contingent result of transferring power to the generation of Ibn Saud’s grandsons.
Policy Implications
• Prepare sanctions for immediate reaction targeting those decision-makers from Saudi Arabia or other highly personalized
political regimes being responsible for the emergence of new petro-aggressions.
• Consider a global moratorium on all arms exports to every party in the Persian Gulf being involved in war-like events as a
mid-term containment of new petro-aggressions.
• Establish a robust regional security organization which should enclose all countries located in the broader Middle East as
a long-term strategy to contain new petro-aggressions.
• Improve policy coordination by creating regular policy consultations between those Asian and European actors, who
would suffer most from the looming consequences of military escalation in the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab.
Saudi foreign policy transformation: from multi-
dependence to petro-aggression
Roughly until the late 1950s, Saudi Arabia was relatively
inactive in regional politics. After having conquered the cen-
tral parts of the Arabian peninsula by force based on a Bed-
ouin army, Ibn Saud’s – the Kingdom’s ruling monarch –
main concern was ‘to consolidate a territorially and socially
expanding habitat and thereby to become an Arab state
equal in scope with the Arabian peninsula’ (Sullivan, 1970,
p. 436). The Saudi Kingdom started to emerge as a regional
leader of the group of Middle East conservative monarchies
in the early 1960s only, trying to oppose the waves of Arab
nationalists’ rhetoric and actions led by the at that time
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and other pan-Arab
republican politicians. Einkreisung – the myth of threatening
encirclement – became a major concern, shaping Riyadh’s
foreign policy ever since. This factor was also at the heart of
the Kingdom’s key overall foreign policy strategy of stabiliz-
ing the regional system’s equilibrium by maintaining its
existing balance of power (Sullivan, 1970).
Based on that perspective, Saudi Arabia has been
depicted as an omni-balancer, trying to counterweight
between threats and challenges at the global, the regional
as well as at the national level simultaneously. Nonneman
(2005), for instance, argues that the Kingdom developed a
strategy of managed multi-dependency as its main foreign
policy preference. Or put differently, as Aarts (2007) has
made clear, Saudi foreign policy maintains polygamous rela-
tions while walking a tightrope. Being interested in the
domestic long-term power maintenance of the ruling Al
Saud family, the two major foreign policy goals of the King-
dom have been to prevent the emergence of clear hege-
mons in the broader Middle East as well as to maintain the
Saudi claim to a hegemonic role on the Arabian Peninsula
by ‘asserting the right to be the dominant foreign partner
for Yemen and the smaller monarchical states that with it
make up the Gulf Cooperation Council’ (Gause, 2002,
p. 196).
As for conflict behaviour, based on a leadership style that
was generally risk-averse Riyadh mostly avoided the initia-
tion of direct interstate conflict (Nonneman, 2005). The lan-
guage articulated towards the regional and international
realms was generally modest and conflict-avoiding, the
Kingdom trying to use its unique hydrocarbon wealth in
order to buy out potential conflict instead. As highlighted
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by Colgan (2013, p. 225), ‘Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy is
marked by two themes: the incentives for international
cooperation generated by oil, and the check-book diplo-
macy made possible by oil income’.
Remarkably, the Arab Spring – a wave of mass uprisings
in the Middle East and North Africa, which would spread
throughout the wider region from December 2010 – led to
several regime breakdowns among Arab republics, but not
among the monarchies in the region (Lucas, 2014). It was
also the starting point for civil wars in Libya, Syria and
Yemen; its consequences induced a noticeable readjustment
of Saudi foreign policy too. As most analysts would probably
agree, Riyadh’s foreign policy decisions have since become
much more assertive – with an offensive, if not even out-
right aggressive, undertone (e.g. Beck, 2016; Ragab, 2017;
Richter, 2014). Since 2011, for the Kingdom the preservation
of monarchical rule in the broader Middle East has become
crucial by actively framing ‘the discourse around ongoing
revolutions in sectarian terms, largely viewing transforma-
tions in the region through the lens of its regional competi-
tion with Iran’ (Ennis and Momani, 2013, p. 1128). The
period between 2011 and the accession of Salman bin
Abdulaziz to the Saudi throne represented, however, only
the precursor towards an even more distinct, now truly belli-
cose and therefore substantial turn in Saudi foreign policy.
Two events illustrate this historical shift.
First, on 26 March 2015, Saudi Arabia – formally together
with a number of partners but in fact taking on the main
burden of responsibility via its own military forces, at least
during the first days of the offensive – started to wage
war on a coalition in northern Yemen led by the Houthi
movement. Although this was not the first time the Saudis
would deal with the Houthis militarily – a previous incur-
sion into Yemeni territory occurred in November 2009 and
continued until early 2010 as a response to Houthi forces
ambushing Saudi border posts – previous Saudi engage-
ment had never been as comprehensive as it was in the
spring of 2015. Based on series of intense air strikes later
supported by ground forces, Riyadh attempted to contain
the growing influence of the Houthi movement, which a
few days earlier had taken the Yemeni capital, Sana’a.
Operation Decisive Storm, as it was officially named, repre-
sented the first step in a currently still ongoing state of
military escalation at the southern end of the Arabian
peninsula. So far, the Saudi–Yemen war has cost thousands
of Yemenis their lives and led to an unprecedented aggra-
vation of the humanitarian situation in the country. From a
historical perspective, the ‘[Saudi] intervention was a sharp
departure from the Kingdom’s habit of arming others while
keeping its own forces in the barracks’ (Benjamin and
Simon, 2019). As became clear from numerous media
reports in the first half of 2015, it was the young prince
and son of the king, Mohammad bin Salman (at that time
two months into being Saudi minister of defence), who
was leading this military campaign (Staff writer, 2015; e.g.
Kerr, 2015).
Second, on 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain cut
diplomatic ties, closed off borders, and issued travel bans
from and to their neighbour Qatar. Over two weeks later,
the now coalition of four – the United Arab Emirates and
Egypt had joined this boycott a few days after it began –
presented Doha with a list of 13 demands to be fulfilled,
otherwise unspecified consequences would follow (Wintour,
2017). The demands were so high that compliance with
them would have meant the end of an independent foreign
policy for Qatar. Again, valid indications exist that this final
escalation of a decade-long simmering feud between Saudi
Arabia and Qatar has been decisively pushed by the per-
sonal decisions of Mohammed bin Salman (e.g. Coughlin,
2017) – motivated, as experts on monarchical regimes have
argued, by the desire to secure his own succession to the
Saudi throne (Lucas, 2017). In February 2018, the Qatari min-
ister of defence accused Saudi Arabia and the UAE of hav-
ing prepared for an invasion during the June 2017 crisis
(Weymouth, 2018). Over a year later, in the summer of 2018,
investigative journalism confirmed that suspicion – high-
lighting that in early June 2018, a military confrontation
between several members of the GCC was only prevented
by the intervention of then United States secretary of state
Rex Tillerson (Emmons, 2018).
Beyond the Saudi intervention in Yemen and the Qatar
crisis – two ongoing events that clearly qualify as militarized
interstate disputes according to standard definitions in
peace and conflict studies (Maoz et al., 2019) – a number of
previously unseen incidents also took place. These testify
further that Saudi foreign policy behaviour has now substan-
tially transformed. Among them are:
1. unprecedented diplomatic feuds with Western countries
• After criticism by the Swedish foreign minister, Mar-
got Wallstr€om, in early 2015 with regard to the
human rights situation in Saudi Arabia and the unilat-
eral termination of the decade-long weapons memo-
randum with Riyadh by Stockholm a few weeks later,
the Saudi ambassador was withdrawn. Riyadh lodged
a formal protest, accusing the minister of ‘flagrant
interference’ in Saudi internal affairs.
• Due to the remark that ‘adventurism’ had spread
throughout the region, made by former German for-
eign minister Sigmar Gabriel in November 2017,
Riyadh recalled its ambassador to Germany, with
medium-term consequences for German businesses
– being afterwards excluded from public procure-
ment. German–Saudi relations would only normalize
again 10 months later, under current head of the
German federal foreign office Heiko Mass in
September 2019.
• In August 2018, Saudi Arabia announced a number
of far-reaching economic sanctions on Canada and
expelled the Canadian ambassador from Riyadh due
to a statement released by the Canadian minister of
foreign affairs, Chrystia Freeland, via Twitter. In her
tweet, Freeland expressed concerns about the recent
imprisonment of Samar Badawi, a Saudi human rights
activist and sister of the prominent blogger Raif
Badawi, who has been behind bars since June 2012.
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2. the threat of military engagement towards other govern-
ments
• Starting in early 2016, the at that time Saudi foreign
minister Adel Jubeir reiterated several times that if
the Syrian political process failed President Assad
would have to be removed by force. Also articulated
was that Saudi Arabia would eventually be willing to
provide troops alongside their deployment by other
states too, in order to remove the Syrian president.
• In June 2018, Riyadh threatened Qatar with military
action if it installed the Russian S-400 missile air
defence system.
3. the active interference in the internal affairs of other
states
• Beyond the threat to remove President Assad from
power there is a well-documented history of Saudi
interference in the Syrian civil war. This the Kingdom
does by supporting warring factions with money and
arms, as well as maintaining training facilities for
rebel groups in Jordan.
• In early November 2017, Lebanese Prime Minister
Saad Hariri was forced to resign from his post upon
arrival in Saudi Arabia. Only after the direct interven-
tion of French President Macron was he allowed to
leave the country, later rescinding his resignation
once back in Beirut.
• In April 2019, it became know that Saudi Arabia
helped pay for the operations of Khalifa Haftar, a Lib-
yan warlord from the eastern part of the country, in
order to try to take the country’s capital, Tripoli.
• More recently, Riyadh had started to support the
crumbling military regime in Sudan amid the rise of
mass protests aiming at establishing a civilian gov-
ernment.
4. the persecution as well as execution of Saudi opposition
members
• While there is increasing indication that opposition
groups in exile have been under surveillance for
years by Saudi government agencies, and anecdotal
evidence exists that occasionally Saudi citizens have
been deported ‘to bring them home’, on 2 October
2018 Jamal Khashoggi – a US-based journalist and
previous member of the Saudi establishment – was
murdered by state agents in the country’s consulate
in Istanbul.
To conclude, a transformation has recently taken place in
traditionally multi-dependent and cooperative Saudi foreign
policy. Clearly, as many analysts have pointed out (e.g.
Karim, 2017; Ragab, 2017; Yossef, 2018), an early starting
point of this change can be traced back to the regional
waves of protests running throughout the Middle East and
North Africa between late 2010 and the second half of
2011. However, since King Salman’s accession to the throne
in January 2015, this foreign policy transformation has
gained new momentum – now with a clearly aggressive
and even bellicose dimension to it.
In order to understand this remarkable change, the paper
puts forward a framework looking at the historical interac-
tion of three crucial elements in order to explain the emer-
gence of and continuity in Saudi petro-aggression: first, the
decreasing power projection towards the Middle East by the
US, the decade-long hegemon, due to gradual changes in
world energy markets and war fatigue at home; second, the
lasting fiscal potency of the Saudi regime due to the most
recent hydrocarbon price hike; and, third, the recent person-
alization of the Saudi monarchy – that is, the transition of
what had been known to be a dynastic monarchy towards a
personalistic and hence absolute monarchical system under
King Salman. While the first two elements can be consid-
ered to be necessary conditions in order to explain the
broader context in which the recent Saudi foreign policy
transformation took place, the personalization of power
within the Saudi monarchy itself is truly crucial in order to
fully explain this substantial policy shift.
The waning nature of US foreign policy in the
Middle East
Historically, the starting point of US interest in the Gulf
region was clearly the strategic importance of crude oil,
which became the main basis of energy production for all
industrialized economies around the globe after World War
II. In July 1933 a first concession was given to Standard Oil
of California (SOCAL), a US company previously operating in
Bahrain, in order to explore and produce crude in the East-
ern Province of Saudi Arabia. This was the first step in a
fruitful US–Saudi business relationship, which later turned
into a close and strategic political partnership between the
two countries. Middle Eastern – and as a main component
of it, Saudi – oil was an indispensable source to fuel recon-
struction and post-War development in Western Europe –
the world region that the US’s security was inextricably tied
to after 1945 (Bronson, 2005).
With the Cold War beginning to unfold and Soviet power
starting to expand globally, the broader Middle East region
gained enormous strategic importance for the US. In this
context, the special significance of the Gulf region for the
US was most prominently highlighted after the Islamic Revo-
lution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as
addressed by US President Jimmy Carter’s state of the union
speech on 23 January 1980:
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by
any outside force to gain control of the Persian
Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the
vital interests of the United States of America, and
such an assault will be repelled by any means
necessary, including military force. (Taylor, 1986,
p. 156)
The Carter Doctrine was the first and most explicit state-
ment of a US security guarantee for the Gulf (Jeffrey and
Eisenstadt, 2016). Securing access to and the free flow of
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hydrocarbon resources from the Persian Gulf was certainly
not the only US interest in the Middle East, but it was defi-
nitely so in the beginning – and was at the core of these
interests for decades to come.1 This became probably most
visible during the 1990s and first decade of the new cen-
tury. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the continuing threat
posed by the Saddam Hussein regime until its overthrow in
2003, the political vacuum after the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan as well as the subsequent rise of Al Qaida –
which eventually caused the US global War on Terror and
the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 – necessitated an enor-
mous presence of US military power in the region. Overall,
the Middle East is the world region in which the US military
has conducted by far the greatest number of operations
since 1945 (Jeffrey and Eisenstadt, 2016).
Under the Obama administration (2009–2017), a percep-
tion arose among the Arab Gulf countries that the US would
not under any condition keep its historical promise of giving
support and protection to its Middle East allies. One crucial
event in this regard was the reaction of President Obama to
the Egyptian revolution in early 2011, and the withdrawal of
unconditional support for long-time friend President
Mubarak. At that point, it became clear to Riyadh and the
other Arab monarchies that ‘the USA is unlikely to conduct
a Cold War-style armed intervention to save the throne of
an ally from its own people’ (Partrick, 2016, p. 361).
What later became known as the Obama Doctrine, a new
defensive role for the US in the region, meant that if none
of the US’s vital national interests were directly concerned
then ‘the mobilization of partners and allies allows for the
sharing of the strategic and operational burden’ (Krieg,
2016, p. 97). Clearly, the refusal by the Obama administra-
tion to robustly sanction by means of military force the use
of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in 2013 – despite
its famous definition of this as a ‘red line’ – as well as the
successful negotiation of the nuclear accord with Iran in
2015 despite major hesitations on the part of close and
long-time allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia exemplify the
new strategic focus in US foreign policy towards the broader
Middle East.
Two substantial structural elements help us to understand
this most recent change in the nature of US foreign policy.
First, during the 2010s US domestic politics has been
marked by war fatigue with regard to the nation’s engage-
ment in the region due to the lengthy and costly military
operations in Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003.
Politicians across the board have therefore called for less
costly global US military engagement, with a special focus
on the Middle East. This was particularly relevant during the
period of austerity in the US emerging as a reaction to the
global financial crisis of 2008. Second, the shale gas revolu-
tion – which many believe to be the greatest boom ever for
the US economy – has significantly decreased the depen-
dency of the US on the import of crude and refined oil
products. As data from the U.S. Energy Information Adminis-
tration signifies, import dependency has drastically reduced
since the middle of the first decade of the new century; in
2017, the value of net imports was the lowest ever since
data first became available (U.S. Energy Information Admin-
istration, 2019).
Based on the observation that the US, as the long-stand-
ing Gulf hegemon and despite recent redeployments of
some troops to the Saudi Kingdom, has been pulling back
from the Middle East as a whole and will very likely hence-
forth not try to penetrate the region as powerfully as it did
in the past, regional actors now face a unique historical situ-
ation ‘enabling them but also forcing them to fend for
themselves. This marks a watershed for regional actors’
security cooperation’ (Sunik, 2018, p. 78). This need becomes
even more acute given the lack of willingness or indeed
capability vis-a-vis power projection by any alternative glo-
bal or regional power. The absence of institutional incen-
tives for mutual exchange and cooperation within the
broader Middle East only accentuates this problem.
The fiscal potency of the Saudi monarchy
Income from hydrocarbon resources was historically and
indeed still is the most important source of government rev-
enue for the Gulf monarchies. Since the 1970s, on average
hydrocarbon revenues have constituted over 50 per cent of
state income in all of them. In Saudi Arabia, being the big-
gest oil producer in the region and one with a leading glo-
bal role, this relative share was significantly higher – and in
many years above the level of 80 per cent (Richter, ). Since
state revenues, and therefore almost all state activity, has
been so dependent on hydrocarbon income, the Gulf
monarchies have been labelled ‘rentier states’ (Beblawi and
Luciani, 1987; Mahdavy, 1970).
Hydrocarbon income is both a blessing and a curse at the
same time. It provides enormous room for fiscal manoeu-
vring on the one side. But it also, on the other, makes gov-
ernment budgets vulnerable to the ups and downs of
hydrocarbon prices on international markets. After the oil
price revolution of the late 1970s, which flooded the
national budgets of the Gulf monarchies with vast hydrocar-
bon incomes up until the early 1980s, and the subsequent
long-lasting low-price phase of hydrocarbon resources (start-
ing during the mid-1980s and lasting until the late 1990s), a
new high-price cycle began in the first years of the new
century – lasting until 2014.2 This second oil price revolution
brought again enormous wealth to the Gulf region. While
only rough approximations exist about the true values of
the wealth accrued within Gulf monarchies during that lat-
est period, a look at the accumulation of international
reserves is considered to be a relatively valid proxy for the
fiscal potency that some of the Gulf monarchies gained. Fig-
ure 1 summarizes data for Saudi Arabia over the period
2003–2018. This data demonstrates the enormous amount
of capital accumulation since 2003. Starting from a level of
US$25 billion at the outset of the new millennium, Saudi
Arabia had accumulated up to US$745 billion in foreign
exchange reserves by August 2014. This was close to 100
per cent of the gross domestic product of the country.
As part of this abundant hydrocarbon liquidity, Gulf
monarchies undertook multiple investments. Among them
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were substantial rounds of rearmament and military upgrad-
ing. After 2003, for instance, Saudi military spending more
than quadrupled from US$18.75 billion to US$87.19 billion
by 2015, the year in which the disastrous Yemen war
started. Today, the relative share of military to total govern-
ment spending is close to 30 per cent and among the high-
est globally (SIPRI, 2019b). Relying on data collected by
SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
Saudi Arabia has been the third-biggest arms importer glob-
ally behind India and China over the period 2003 till 2018
(SIPRI, 2019a). Figure 2 summarizes the annual values of this
in millions of SIPRI’s Trend Indicator Values. The figure
clearly signifies that there was an upwards trend in the
overall volumes of arms imports since 2003, which corre-
lates with the steady rise in world oil prices at least until
2014.
The personalization of the Saudi monarchy
Saudi Arabia is an authoritarian monarchy, with Wahhabi
Islam the official religion. Since its self-declared indepen-
dence in 1932, the country has been ruled by the Al Sauds
– a noble family originating from Nejd, one of the inner
regions of the Arabian peninsula. The current Saudi king,
Salman bin Abdulaziz, now in his mid-80s, is the oldest sur-
viving son of the legendary founding father of the modern
Saudi state, King Abdulaziz Al Saud. Ibn Saud, the name he
became well known by in the West, used to be an absolute
ruler legitimized by the century-old political alliance with
the puritanical reform movement of Wahhabi Islam and by
his personal reputation as a tribal sheikh and field comman-
der during the conquest of the main parts of the Arabian
peninsula by his forces after 1902.
After the demise of the nation’s founding father in 1953,
a distinct system of family rule and power sharing among a
select group of his male descendants emerged. What
started as shared rule between the two oldest sons of the
late king – Saud as his father’s immediate successor, and
Faysal as heir apparent – developed into several rounds of
intense inner-family feuds during the late 1950s and early
1960s, incorporating competing groups from among the
most senior sons of Ibn Saud (Kechichian, 2008). After more
than five years of inner-family strife, Faysal – supported by
those of his brothers who later became the core group of
Saudi decision-makers – overthrew King Saud and took the
throne in his place. This sequence of events eventually led
to what later was described to be a dynastic monarchy
(Herb, 1999) – that is, a kind of rule by several core mem-
bers of the royal family based on a system of separated
domains which provided highly autonomous playing fields
for each of the senior princes (e.g. Al-Rasheed, 2005; Her-
tog, 2010). The king, even though formally holding absolute
power, was only the primus inter pares, and needed to
make sure that a political decision was only reached after
extensive consultation among senior princes. This system,
quite in contrast to most of the personalistic dictatorships
within other Arab states at the time, was often slow and
inefficient, but entailed a strong notion of within-family
deliberation about key policy issues (Karim, 2017). Based on
the experience of the paralysing rivalry between Saud und
Faysal during the late 1950s and early 1960s, to seek con-
sensus and not feud within the family would become the
guiding principle of Saudi foreign policy decisions until very
recently.
Strikingly, with King Salman ascending to the throne in
January 2015 a process of centralization would take place
Figure 1. Foreign Exchange Reserves and the Budget Balance of Saudi Arabia from 2003 to 2018.
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(Karim, 2017; Hertog, 2018; Benjamin and Simon, 2019).
Eventually, this led to the abandoning of the traditional sys-
tem of intra-family consensus-seeking. This process not only
restructured the policy making cycle, rendering it less time-
consuming and hence making it more efficient, but also cre-
ated a significant higher degree of personalization, leaving
final decision-making in the hands of formally two men –
often even only one man. This was Muhammed bin Salman,
the favourite son of the new king, who in April 2015
became deputy crown prince and in June 2017 was pro-
moted to be the next king of Saudi Arabia when his father
passes away. Since early 2015, though, the previously estab-
lished model of a dynastic monarchy has transformed into a
system of a very personalized monarchy, thereby leaving
decision-making exclusively with the king and his heir
apparent. Two aspects are crucial to understanding this
groundbreaking transformation and personalization of the
Saudi policy making system.
First, King Salman is the last from among the group
of senior princes who have dominated the policy making
of Saudi Arabia for decades (House, 2016; Al-Rasheed,
2018; Hertog, 2018). He was the governor of Riyadh, the
Saudi capital, from 1963 to 2011 and belongs to the
‘Sudairi seven’ – a powerful group of full-brothers among
the sons of Ibn Saud. Salman early on became interested
in politics, being a close follower of and advisor to his
older full-brothers Fahd (king between 1982 and 2005),
Sultan (long-time minister of defence and crown prince
between 2005 and 2011) and Nayef (long-time minister
of interior and crown prince between 2011 and 2012)
(Wihbey, 1997). Historically, the Sudairi seven were crucial
supporters of Faisal during the inner-family feud with
King Saud in the early 1960s (Kechichian, 2008). As a
result of Faisal’s accession to the throne, he promoted
the Sudairi brothers to become key players in the con-
solidating Saudi state during a period of soaring hydro-
carbon revenues. Strikingly, it was largely the fact that
Salman was the only brother left from among the sons
of Ibn Saud who decisively shaped the early consolida-
tion of the modern Saudi state during the 1960s and
1970s which would, after the death of Abdullah in Jan-
uary 2015, provide him with a previously unseen auton-
omy as the new Saudi king to shape the future
trajectory of the country under his tenure and according
to his own personal preferences.
Second, the aspirations of King Salman’s favourite – but
not oldest – son Mohammad, a young, self-confident and
overly ambitious prince, equipped him with the instincts
necessary to take the opportunity to prepare for his own
accession to the throne after his father became crown
prince in June 2012. Based on the few accounts which
exist about Muhammed bin Salman, or MBS as he is often
referred to, he already as a child – being the oldest
among his full-brothers – ‘went after what he wanted. The
more often he got it, the more assured he became’
(House, 2019, p. 18). The prince was mainly educated
within Saudi Arabia, and became very close to his father
by working together with him already at the age of 17. In
the course of time, he was able to earn the deep trust
and respect of his father. Positioned as the later king’s
closest follower and the head of his personal court, MBS
profited immensely from his father’s role as the governor
of Riyadh and head of the Al Saud family (or Descendants
Council).
Figure 2. Annual Saudi Arms Imports, 2003–2018.
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Young MBS began to stick to his father, soaking up
how to deal with fractious tribal leaders, learning
what princes were guilty of which indiscretions, sit-
ting through the meetings his workaholic father
had daily. All of this information later was put to
use by the Crown Prince as he consolidated power
against his royal relatives and subdued religious
and tribal forces. (House, 2019, p. 9)
On a more personal note, Prince Muhammed – quite in
contrast to the vast majority of the other male descendants
of Ibn Saud – seems to be an outstanding example of a
risk-taker. ‘His aides say he consistently opts for action over
caution. The risk inherent in change, he tells associates, is
less than the risk of doing nothing’ (House, 2019, p. 15).
How this personal trait might play out in real politics was
confirmed by a leaked memo of the BND, the German for-
eign intelligence agency, in early December 2015. It
assessed the new Saudi foreign policy as ‘ready to take
unprecedented military, financial and political risks in order
not to fall into a disadvantageous position in the region’
(Smale, 2015).
As has been rightly pointed out by leading experts on
Saudi Arabia, one major consequence of the personalization
of the Saudi decision-making system under the dominance
of now crown prince Mohammad bin Salman is the expecta-
tion of a more assertive foreign policy (Kinninmont, 2015)
and a generally ‘larger appetite for risk than the consensus-
oriented previous leadership had’ (Hertog, 2018, p. 89). How-
ever, an understanding of the necessary and therefore
enabling conditions of the current shift in Saudi foreign pol-
icy behaviour would be incomplete without taking into con-
sideration two additional elements. First, the nature of the
contemporary Middle East policy of the US – which for more
than three decades represented the hegemonic power in
the region, but who, as noted, has begun to redefine and
adjust its role permanently therefore creating opportunities
as well as necessity for single state action. Second, the lega-
cies and opportunities of the Saudi rentier state, which
makes available the enormous hydrocarbon revenues to be
freely spent at the discretion of the ruler and his son. This is
done by little in the way of additional institutional and
social constraints to decision-making existing, especially in
the realm of foreign policy. How these elements interact
with each other, forming a historically unique constellation
which has led to the emergence of Saudi petro-aggression,
will now be discussed.
When does (new) petro-aggression emerge?
Jeff Colgan (2010, 2011, 2013) has highlighted that global
oil consumption is a significant cause of international war.
‘Under certain conditions, oil income enables aggressive
leaders to eliminate political constraints, reduce domestic
accountability, and take their countries to war’ (Colgan,
2013, p. 1). Aggressive leadership, as he argues, arises in the
context of domestic political revolutions, predominantly for
two main reasons. First, revolutionary dynamics tend to
favour risk-taking leaders, who aim at revising the status
quo. Second, revolutions by definition eliminate existing
institutional constraints that otherwise could have nullified
risk-taking politicians. A combination of revolutionary leader-
ship with high oil income creates an especially bellicose
context. Oil exports facilitate risk-taking leaders if they are
able to control respective revenues, which is invariably the
case due to the unique nature of oil income being easily
centrally controlled by a small group of political elites – or
even a single actor. ‘Yet a leader with huge financial
resources to redistribute to purchase political support can
afford to take risks, including those involved in aggressive
foreign policy adventurism’ (Colgan, 2013, p. 4).
As brilliant as this argumentation might be in explaining
the warfare of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Libya under
Muammar Qaddafi, Iran under the Islamic regime and the
aggressive regional ambitions of Venezuela under Hugo
Chavez (four oil states with clearly different revolutionary
regimes), Colgan’s approach is by and large unsuited to
making sense of the most recent Saudi foreign policy trans-
formation however. The Saudi Kingdom being an oil expor-
ter par excellence does not mean it has ever been a
revolutionary regime. The rise of Saudi petro-aggression, as
outlined above, is even more puzzling when it is pointed
out that the historical evolution of Saudi foreign policy is
used by Colgan (2013, p. 56) as an important contrasting
example for demonstrating the cooperative incentives which
arise from producing crude oil – with it helping ‘to avoid
international conflict which interrupts export sales and other
economic links’. What, therefore, are the relevant factors
and combinations of them that might explain the surprising
turn towards a bellicose foreign policy by Saudi Arabia after
2015, an oil exporter previously considered to be largely
cooperatively embedded in world politics? I suggest three
interacting elements worth considering in this context.
First, the continuous availability of fiscal resources stem-
ming from oil revenues allows for the socially unconstrained
and intensified development of military capabilities. This
new military strength can then be used to deter external
threats, to proactively prevent emerging challenges or to
expand a given country’s own influence and power through-
out its region. The rise of military spending in Saudi Arabia,
as discussed above, testifies to the relevance of this devel-
opment against the backdrop outlined in this paper.
Second, the stepping back by a hegemonic power within
the framework of a fragmented regional system – one in
which no robust regional security cooperation organization
exists – is especially prone to generating instability. The ris-
ing propensity for military conflict can be expected for two
different reasons: (1) emerging or aspiring regional powers
will exist in direct contrast with each other; and (2) no regio-
nal crisis management or security institutions are in place,
meaning regional actors are left alone with crisis prevention
and management. As a result, for each member of the
regional state system the incentives to preserve their own
individual security above all else increase. As laid out in
detail earlier, the Obama Doctrine and subsequent US for-
eign policy towards the Middle East can be interpreted as
having signalled the intention by that country to genuinely
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disengage from the Middle East. Consequently, regional as
well as extra-regional actors have started to become increas-
ingly active in regional affairs – causing intense competition,
and with it the rise of violent tensions within the region.
Both the latent fiscal potency based on the past and con-
tinuing flows of oil income, which enable domestically
unconstrained petro-dollar recycling in order to catch up
militarily, have in combination with the regional-level condi-
tion of heightened insecurity and fragmentation provided
the necessary structural incentives (or conditions) for some
oil-exporting monarchies to increasingly consider military
action a valid means of resolving competing foreign policy
goals. However it is, third and most importantly, the rise of
risk-taking leaders at the national level that makes this struc-
tural constellation especially dangerous. MBS, current Saudi
crown prince and the person most likely to become the
next king, represents this category masterfully. A general
personality attribute of not being afraid of taking risks,
together with his pronounced will to become the next Saudi
king, has since 2015 led to an unprecedented personaliza-
tion of decision-making within Saudi Arabia’s recent history.
Similarly, as described in the existing literature on petro-ag-
gression looking at oil-exporting revolutionary regimes,
Saudi oil income has significantly helped to facilitate the
current process of centralizing power in the Kingdom. As
recent research on the emergence of the Public Investment
Fund (PIF) – the sovereign wealth fund of Saudi Arabia –
has shown, PIF has become a major tool developed and
used by the crown prince in order to increase his grip on
power by controlling fiscal and economic activities both
within Saudi Arabia and abroad – undertaken ultimately in
order to prepare for his accession to the throne (Roll, 2019).
The larger consequences of this historical conjunction of
these three elements are wholly depressing. As a close fol-
lower of the crown prince’s ascension has noted: ‘If his short
history is any guide, there is little likelihood of major
changes in the Crown Prince’s character or style’ (House,
2019, p. 18). Also little prospect exists that the US’s current
Trump administration will discontinue the broader policies
laid out in the Obama Doctrine, with the only exception
being that Iran is now seen as the greatest threat across the
broader Middle East and Saudi Arabia has emerged as a crit-
ical partner ‘in our efforts to advance regional stability’
(Polaschik et al., 2019, p. 8). Against the general background
context discussed in this paper, this means a ‘dangerous
region is getting more volatile’ (Riedel, 2017). Or, summa-
rized, more bluntly: ‘Mohammed bin Salman, if allowed to
ascend to the throne without facing any consequences from
Washington for his outrageous behavior, will likely terrorize
the region for decades, just as Saddam did’ (Toossi and
Costello, 2018).
While besides targeted sanctions few immediate possibili-
ties are left for policy makers to shape this constellation,
there are two broader – both medium- and long-term –
strategies to work on at least. First, a global moratorium on
arms exports should be established – one which has to
include all parties in the Persian Gulf involved in war-like
events. As the cynical support of the US and UK during the
Yemen war of the last years has shown, Arab monarchies’
warfare capabilities are critically dependent on Western sup-
port. Cutting off this support could reduce the likelihood of
war being actively waged in the region.
Second, and as a long-term policy commitment, Asian
and European powers have to heavily invest in the estab-
lishment of a robust regional security organization for the
broader Middle East including all countries situated in the
region. The looming consequences of military escalation in
the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, leading to the
potential interruption of crucial trade routes, will be extre-
mely costly – especially for European Union members states
as well as for a number of East, South and Southeast Asian
countries. Policy makers from these countries should there-
fore be particularly interested in helping contain future
petro-aggression within the Middle East.
Notes
The author thanks Martin Beck, Morten Valbjørn, Ray Hinnebusch, one
anonymous reviewer, discussants at the 2018 international conference
‘The Middle East and North Africa in an Age of Continuous Crisis, Con-
flicts, and Cracks’ at the University of Southern Denmark (SDU), and the
editor of the journal for their feedback.
1. Supporting the existence of the State of Israel (since 1967) and the
containment of Soviet-style communism (until the late 1980s) were
two of the other strategic interests to have closely bound the US to
the broader Middle East region (Hudson, 2016).
2. On 23 June 2014 a barrel of crude oil (about 159 litres) was being
traded at a price of US$111.18 on the futures exchange in Dubai. By
the end of 2014, the price had dropped to US$53.76 per barrel –
meaning that the most important income source of not only Saudi
Arabia but all of the other oil exporters had seen its value halve in
just six months. Since then crude oil price have oscillated within
wide margins, but have never reached the level of 2014 again.
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